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May 07, 2020

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

BETWEEN:

**NEW BRUNSWICK ENERGY AND
UTILITIES BOARD (the Board)**

-AND-

**NEW BRUNSWICK POWER CORPORATION
(NB Power)**

WHEREAS the New Brunswick Energy and Utilities Board (“the Board”) is authorized, pursuant to section 122 of the *Electricity Act S.N.B. 2013 c.7 (Electricity Act)* to monitor and assess compliance and enforce reliability standards in the province of New Brunswick;

AND WHEREAS the Board is responsible for administering the New Brunswick Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program pursuant to section 14 of Regulation 2013-66 being the *Reliability Standards Regulation- Electricity Act (Regulation)*;

AND WHEREAS New Brunswick Power Corporation (“NB Power”) is a registered entity pursuant to section 121 of the *Electricity Act* and responsible to comply with applicable reliability standards;

AND WHEREAS the Board has determined that NB Power has violated Board approved North American Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”) reliability standard IRO-009-2 Reliability Coordinator Actions to Operate Within IROLs, Requirement 1, Requirement 2 and Requirement 3;

AND WHEREAS on March 7, 2019 the Board approved a request by NB Power to enter into settlement negotiations to resolve NB Power violations of the above named reliability standard;

AND WHEREAS the settlement negotiations between the Board and NB Power are now concluded and both the Board and NB Power agree to the within terms as a settlement agreement in resolution of the violations;

AND WHEREAS the Board has carefully considered the requirements of the *Electricity Act* and the *Regulation*;

AND WHEREAS the Board is satisfied that the reliability of the Bulk Power System will not be compromised and that a violation of a Board Approved Reliability Standard will not occur as a result of this settlement;

NOW THEREFORE the Board and NB Power execute this Settlement Agreement ("Settlement Agreement") pursuant to Section 4.9 (i) of the New Brunswick Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program being Schedule A of the *Regulation* and upon the following terms:

I. Introduction

1. NB Power is registered on the New Brunswick Compliance Registry as a Balancing Authority (BA), Distribution Provider (DP), Generator Owner (GO), Generator Operator (GOP), Interchange Authority (IA), Load Serving Entity (LSE), Planning Authority (PA), Purchasing-Selling Entity (PSE), Reliability Coordinator (RC), Resource Planner (RP), Reserve Sharing Group (RSG), Transmission Owner (TO), Transmission Operator (TOP), Transmission Planner (TP), and Transmission Service Provider (TSP). NB Power's registration number in New Brunswick is NBCR001.
2. On April 6, 2017, NB Power submitted into the CMRS, a Self-Report of a potential non-compliance of Requirement 3 of IRO-009-2 for an event that occurred on July 18, 2016. On June 9, 2017, NB Power received a Notice of Potential Violation from the Board for this requirement.
3. The July 18, 2016 event led to a NPCC Spot Check to evaluate compliance with IRO-009-2 requirements R1, R2 and R4 and FAC-014-2 requirement R5. The NPCC Spot Check report dated April 9, 2018 and provided to NB Power on October 10, 2018 by the Board, identified three (3) additional potential non-compliances of IRO-009-2. The additional potential non-compliances identified relate to IRO-009-2 requirements R1, R2 and R4. On October 10, 2018, NB Power received a Notice of Potential Violation from the Board for requirements R1 and R2.
4. On March 7, 2019, the Board approved a request by NB Power to enter into settlement negotiations to resolve three Potential Violations described in this Term Sheet. The Board also provided NB Power notice that it does not intend to pursue the potential noncompliance of requirement R4 as identified in the NPCC Spot Check report.
5. NB Power has agreed to pay an assessed financial penalty of \$160,000 in addition to mitigation actions to correct the violations, mitigate their impact on bulk power system reliability and prevent future reoccurrences.
6. The term violation as used in this Term Sheet refers to any of the three violations that were identified by the Board as Potential Violations based upon the Self-Report and Spot Check.

Violations

VTN	Standard	Requirement	Associated Function	Violation Risk Factor	Violation Severity Level	Discovery Method
2018007	IRO-009-2	R1	RC	Medium	Severe	Spot Check
2018008	IRO-009-2	R2	RC	High	Severe	Spot Check
2017002	IRO-009-2	R3	RC	High	Severe	Self Report

A. Reliability Standard and Requirements

The purpose of IRO-009-2 is as follows:

To prevent instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading outages that adversely impact the reliability of the interconnection by ensuring prompt action to prevent or mitigate instances of exceeding Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits (IROLs).

R1. *For each IROL (in its Reliability Coordinator Area) that the Reliability Coordinator identifies one or more days prior to the current day, the Reliability Coordinator shall have one or more Operating Processes, Procedures, or Plans that identify actions the Reliability Coordinator shall take or actions the Reliability Coordinator shall direct others to take (up to and including load shedding)*

1.1. *That can be implemented in time to prevent the identified IROL exceedance.*

1.2. *To mitigate the magnitude and duration of an IROL exceedance such that the IROL exceedance is relieved within the IROL's Tv.*

R2. *Each Reliability Coordinator shall initiate one or more Operating Processes, Procedures, or Plans (not limited to the Operating Processes, Procedures, or Plans developed for Requirement R1) that are intended to prevent an IROL exceedance, as identified in the Reliability Coordinator's Real-time monitoring or Real-time Assessment.*

R3. *The Reliability Coordinator shall act or direct others to act so that the magnitude and duration of an IROL exceedance is mitigated within the IROL's Tv, as identified in the Reliability Coordinator's Real-time monitoring or Real-time Assessment.*

B. Discovery

1. On April 6, 2017, NB Power submitted into the CMRS, a Self-Report of a potential non-compliance of Requirement 3 of IRO-009-2 for an event that occurred on July 18, 2016.
2. A subsequent NPCC Spot Check report dated April 9, 2018 resulted in two (2) additional Potential Violations of IRO-009-2 occurring at the same time as the original. The additional Potential Violations identified related to requirements R1 and R2.

C. New Brunswick and ISONE Interface

The New Brunswick (NB) and New England (NE) interface consists of two parallel 345 kV paths. Depending on the MW flows from NB toward ISO-New England (ISO-NE), a Dedicated Path Logic (DPL) Special Protection System (SPS) is armed and generation is selected for rejection in order to immediately reduce the flow on the remaining path for the loss of the other. NB Power and ISO-NE routinely schedule over the IROL level for power flow on these two paths knowing that the SPS is in place to immediately reduce flows on the remaining path.

NB Power states that its methodology for managing the 750 MW IROL limit in real time during the time of the event described below was as follows:

When Actual Flows from NB to NE are less than 700MW

- No alarming or actions required.

When Actual Flows from NB to NE are greater than 700MW

- When Actual Flows from NB to NE are greater than 700MW, NB Power selects enough DPL SPS generation for rejection to reduce flows to below 700 MW in the event of the loss of one of the two paths into NE (the “contingency”). As an objective, NB Power strives to stay at least 50 MW under the IROL limit to prevent an exceedance.
- A NBP-SO alarm to prevent the IROL comes in whenever the actual flow to ISO-NE minus the amount of selected DPL SPS generation is greater than 700 MW. The operator action to prevent the IROL is to select additional DPL SPS generation or reduce exports to ISO-NE if there is no additional generation available for selection.
- A NBP-SO alarm to mitigate the IROL comes in whenever the actual flow to ISO-NE minus the amount of selected DPL SPS generation is greater than 750 MW. The actions to mitigate the IROL are to select additional DPL SPS generation or reduce exports to ISO-NE if there is no additional generation available for selection. The operator actions are the same as above. The alarm exists to indicate that the IROL limit is being exceeded.

Description of July 18, 2016 IROL Event

On the evening of July 17, 2016 into the morning of July 18, 2016 (Atlantic Time), there was an inadequate amount of DPL SPS generation selected for rejection resulting in an exceedance of the IROL limit for a period greater than the T_v limit (30 minutes.) The following describes the sequence of events related to the IROL that were occurring as a result of NB Power System Operator (NBP-SO) action and/or inaction:

- July 17, 2016, 23:44 (IROL OK)

NBP-SO and ISO-NE agree to a schedule change from 806 MW to 941 MW for the next hour. The ISO-NE operator did not confirm that the DPL was armed and that the proper amount of generation was selected in accordance with ISO-NE procedure in effect at the time. Actual flow into ISO-NE is 823.0 MW and the amount of generation selected for rejection is 150.5. The post contingency flow would be 672.5 MW which is below the 700 warning alarm. Since the morning of July 15, NB Power had generation selected for rejection at levels to prevent an IROL limit exceedance.

- July 17, 2016, 23:58 (IROL Warning)

As a result of increasing flows (857.9) into ISO-NE and no significant change in the amount of generation selected (152.6), the NBP-SO received a warning alarm indicating the amount of selected generation was insufficient to reduce flows below 700 MW (705.3).

- July 18, 2016, 00:04 (IROL Exceedance)

For the same reason as described above, the NBP-SO receives an IROL Alarm as the actual flow (909.9) minus the amount of generation selected (152.3) is greater than 750 MW (757.6). The IROL limit is now being exceeded by 7.6 MW.

- July 18, 2016, 00:06 (IROL Exceedance)

In response to the IROL Alarm, the NBP-SO operator selects an additional 30 MW of generation at Eel River for rejection.

- July 18, 2016, 00:07 (IROL Exceedance)

NBP-SO operator instructs the Mactaquac Hydro Station to switch Unit 6 from “synchronous condense” to “generate” mode so that 50 MW can be selected for rejection. This would enable up to 110 MW of additional generation to be available for selection.

During the switch Unit # 6 trips offline and Mactaquac informs the NBP-SO that it will be brought back online.

- July 18, 2016, 00:11 (IROL Exceedance)

Mactaquac reports to NBP-SO that it will take approximately ten minutes to get Unit 6 back on line. In accordance with the procedure, the NBP-SO should have reduced exports so that actual flow minus the amount of generation selected is less than 700 MW.

- July 18, 2016, 00:12 (IROL Warning)

As a result of the additional 30 MW of DPL SPS generation selected and lower flows into ISO-NE, the IROL limit is no longer being exceeded. A partial action of the System Operator mitigates the IROL exceedance in approximately 8

minutes. Actual flow into NE is 916.8 MW and the amount of generation selected is 182.5 MW. The post contingency flow would be 734.3, which, is below the 750 MW IROL limit, but, above the preferred value of 700 MW.

- July 18, 2016, 00:20 (IROL Exceedance)

Increasing flows into NE and no significant change in the amount of selected generation triggers an IROL exceedance alarm. The IROL limit will continue to be exceeded for the next 55 minutes.

Actual flow into NE is 941.9 and the amount of generation selected is 181.3. With a post contingency flow of 760.6 the limit is being exceeded by 10.6 MW.

- July 18, 2016, 00:21 (IROL Exceedance)

Based on the last communication with Mactaquac, the NBP-SO is expecting Unit 6 to come online any minute and resolve the IROL limit exceedance. The IROL exceedance duration is at approximately 1 minute.

- July 18, 2016, 00:35 (IROL Exceedance)

The NBP-SO operator contacts Mactaquac and is informed that Unit 6 will be back online in a few minutes. The IROL duration is at 15 minutes.

- July 18, 2016, 00:37 (IROL Exceedance)

NBP-SO and ISO-NE agree to a next hour schedule change from 941 to 976 MW. The NBP-SO operator did not communicate that the IROL limit was being exceeded and the ISO-NE operator did not confirm that the DPL was armed and that the proper amount of generation was selected. The IROL exceedance duration is at 17 minutes.

- July 18, 2016, 00:40 (IROL Exceedance)

Mactaquac informs the NBP-SO that they are having issues getting Unit 6 back online. The NBP-SO operator instructs Mactaquac to call in support staff to get the Unit online as it is required for selection. The IROL exceedance duration is at 20 minutes and the limit is being exceeded by 28.9 MW.

- July 18, 2016, 00:47 (IROL Exceedance)

Mactaquac informs the NBP-SO that staff has been called in.

- July 18, 2016, 00:50 (IROL Exceedance)

The IROL limit has now been exceeded for more than the allowable time of 30 minutes. The actual flow into NE is 966.6 and the amount of generation selected is 189.5. With a post contingency flow of 777.1 the limit is being exceeded by 27.1 MW.

- July 18, 2016, 01:00 (IROL Exceedance)

NBP-SO operator contacts ISO-NE operator and informs them of the deficiency in the amount of selected DPL SPS generation as a result of the Mactaquac Unit 6 trip. Both parties discuss the need to reduce the export schedule from 976 to 890 MW.

- July 18, 2016, 01:03 (IROL Exceedance)

NBP-SO and ISO NE agree to reduce the export schedule to 890 MW. As 191.8 MW of generation is selected, the schedule is set at 890 so that post contingency flows would be less than 700 MW. Actual flow into NE is 965.6 and the amount of generation selected is 191.8. With a post contingency flow of 773.7, the IROL is being exceeded by 23.7 MW.

- July 18, 2016, 01:15 (IROL Warning)

As a result of NB to ISO-NE curtailment of export schedules, the flow into NE is reduced to the point that the IROL limit was no longer being exceeded. The duration of the exceedance was 55 minutes, 25 minutes longer than the 30 minutes allowance. Actual flow into NE is 930.3 and the amount of generation selected is 188.9. The post contingency flow would be 741.5 MW which is higher than the preferred value of 700. As a result the NBP-SO IROL warning alarm is still active.

- July 18 2016, 01:23 (IROL OK)

As a result of NB to ISO-NE export schedule curtailment, the combination of flow toward ISO-NE and the amount of generation selected for rejection is sufficient to reduce post contingency flow toward ISO-NE below 700 MW post contingency and the IROL warning alarm clears.

- July 18, 2016 10:02 (IROL OK)

With actuals flows down to 609.5 MW, NB Power no longer has any generation selected for rejection.

When the NBP-SO operator became aware that a Mactaquac generating unit could not come online to increase the amount of selected generation, the interchange schedule in the NB Power Energy Management System (EMS) should have been changed immediately. If that had occurred, the 30-minute duration may not have even started and the 30 minutes may not have expired. Instead the operator incorrectly remained focused on the more common solution of selecting generation (the Mactaquac unit) to resolve the issue.

In addition, NB Power did not communicate sufficiently to ISO-NE that a reliability event was imminent/occurring to allow ISO-NE to offer a possible solution before the 30 minute IROL deadline was exceeded. NB Power was providing ISO-NE with the SCADA points that would allow them to independently monitor the status of the IROL in real time.

D. Violations

Requirement 1, Spot Check, VTN2018007:

The NB Power procedural documents did not clearly document the reliability reason for arming the SPS at certain MW levels and the relation of those MW arming levels to the actual IROL limit. The in-effect NB Power procedure/process (*RC-EOP-4.1, Version 11, dated 6/30/16, Section 4.5, the "Operating Plan"*) associated with the DPL SPS did not:

1. Provide the necessary background to the System Operator on the reliability reasons for the DPL SPS, the different arming level alarms, and the risks to the system without it being properly armed.
2. Specifically require the System Operator to arm the SPS with the proper amount of online generation selected for rejection before the IROL limit was reached.
3. Clearly convey to the System Operator that the expectation is that the 30-minute IROL exceedance duration shall not be allowed to start in instances when the IROL is being exceeded due to hourly interchange schedules.

Therefore, NB Power did not have what NPCC considers to be the required depth in the documented Operating Process, Procedure, or Plan that identified the needed actions to take or to direct others to take that could be implemented to prevent the IROL exceedance.

NB Power did not self-report the violation of requirement R1 when it reported a compliance issue with R3. NB Power completed a self-assessment of compliance following the IROL event and concluded that compliance with requirement R1 was met. NB Power's conclusion was based on past audit findings and whether or not the actions in the procedure would prevent or mitigate the IROL. With a past track record of preventing and mitigating IROL's NB Power did not consider a lack of depth as being a measure of compliance and as such concluded that a self-report was not warranted. NB Power was under the impression that the measure of adequacy would ultimately be addressed in R3, which has a clear performance target.

Requirement 2, Spot Check, VTN2018008:

On July 18, 2016, the hourly interchange with ISO-NE was scheduled over the IROL for power flows from NB into ISO-NE. Flows from NB to NE can be greater than the IROL limit as long as the NB System Operator is properly responding to the DPL SPS alarms that are triggered before the IROL value is reached in real-time. On this date, the System Operator did not initiate the proper real-time actions, based on past training, or, as described in RC-EOP-4.1, or, any other actions intended to prevent the IROL value (750 MW) from being exceeded and the commencement of the 30-minute duration.

Therefore, NB Power did not initiate all of its Operating Process, Procedure, or Plan or take other action to prevent the IROL exceedance from beginning.

NB Power did not self-report the violation when it reported a compliance issue with R3. NB Power's interpretation of compliance was not based on whether or not all the actions were fully implemented. It was based on whether or not some action within the process was initiated. This view was reinforced by the standard drafting team's rejection of the suggestion that language in the standard use words stronger than "initiate". NB Power considered the alarming itself to be an action as well as the fact that some generation was already selected.

Requirement 3, Self-Report, VTN2017002:

On July 18, 2016, the System Operator did not take sufficient action in real-time to mitigate the IROL exceedance within 30 minutes as the IROL level (750 MW) was exceeded for 55 minutes.

Therefore, NB Power did not mitigate the IROL exceedance within 30 minutes.

E. Root Cause of the July 17-18 2016 IROL Exceedance

There was inadequate human performance by one System Operator on July 17-18, 2016. This System Operator had been trained on the position duties just as all of the System Operators had been trained. The root cause is not related to the procedure that NPCC feels needs strengthening. Rather, the root cause is solely related to one System Operator not following the protocols that the operator had been trained on for dealing with IROLs on the NB to ISONE interface.

F. Risk Assessment

NPCC determined that the depth of the procedure had no bearing on the IROL exceedance event. Procedures without the proper amount of depth could lead to confusion and general delayed response, but System Operators are expected and employed to follow the protocols that they were trained on when they are placed in this position of Operational Authority. The lack of depth in the procedure, and thus the Requirement 1 violation, posed a moderate risk to the BPS.

The Potential Violations of Requirement 2 and Requirement 3 each posed a moderate risk to the BPS due to incomplete real-time actions. The failure to take all the proper actions could have resulted in uncontrolled separation of a portion of the ISO-NE system and the Maritimes area from ISO-NE and the Eastern Interconnection if the one of the two parallel paths into ISO-NE was lost (the "contingency") while an actual IROL was being exceeded.

In addition to the risk of exceeding the IROL limit, there was additional risk related to an after the fact discovery that ISO-NE had not identified or informed NB Power that their IROL was 700 MW. This additional risk is solely borne by ISO-NE who is responsible for the studies used to determine the IROL and then communicate it.

In its Self-Report for Requirement R3, NB Power identified the IROL threshold as 750 MW and the SPS arming level as 700 MW. The difference in distinction between those

levels was not apparent in the NB Power Operating procedure (RC-EOP-004.1, Maritimes Reliability Coordinator Operator Actions for IROL Exceedances, Version 11, 6/30/16) that was in effect at the time. The alarms at 700 and 750 MW did however require the System Operator to take the same actions. The inaction by the NB Power System Operator to reduce the interchange schedule caused the IROL to be exceeded for greater than 30 minutes.

To reduce the likelihood of an IROL exceedance NB Power's real time monitoring system has both visual and audible alarms to ensure that the system operator is aware that steps need to be taken to both prevent and mitigate an IROL exceedance. The steps are identified in a procedure. The alarms are what triggered the operator to select all of available resources for rejection. While the operator failed to reduce export schedules to prevent and mitigate the IROL, the actions that were taken reduced the impact of a contingency by the amount of resources selected for rejection. This reduced the likelihood that a contingency would cause a separation.

The NB Power operator did take some actions (selecting generation for rejection) to mitigate the level of the IROL exceedance, resulting in an average IROL exceedance of 28 MW and a maximum of 58 MW.

Finally, there was no actual harm to the bulk power system.

G. Mitigation

The mitigation activities to end the violations and prevent recurrence consists of the following:

1. Mitigate the IROL by reducing the export schedule from 976 MW to 890 MW. Completed July 18, 2016, 01:15 hours
2. Communicate the importance of timely responses to IROLs to all NB Power System Operators. Completed November 3, 2016
3. Removed System Operator responsible for taking action during the IROL exceedance from their role. Completed November 25, 2016
4. Implement an automated routine that sends emails when predetermined IROL's are detected by the Energy Management System. This provides a secondary means of detecting IROLs in the event that the IROL is not logged. Completed October 26, 2016
5. Added a timer in the control room to monitor the duration of IROL exceedances. Completed August 2018.
6. Revised section 4.4 of procedure "RC-EOP-004.1" (Maritimes RC Operator Actions for IROL Exceedances) to include an explanation of both the DPL Warning and DPL IROL alarm. Completed February 9, 2017 (Version 12)
7. Revised section 4.4 of procedure "RC-EOP-004.1" to clarify that the System Operator is required to take the same actions for either the DPL Warning or DPL

IROL alarm. This ensures that the operator takes action before the IROL is exceeded. Completed August 24, 2017 (Version 13)

8. Revised section 4.4 of procedure “RC-EOP-004.1” to:
 - provide additional background on the reliability reasons for the DPL SPS, the associated alarms and the risk to the system when it is not armed;
 - include System Operator actions triggered by schedule changes that requires the appropriate amount of generation to be selected or available for selection prior to ramping of the schedule. (Completed December 18, 2019)
9. Train all System Operators on the revised “RC-EOP-004.1” procedure. (Completed December 2019)
10. Train all System Operators on the revised “NB-SPS-02 NB-NE” document (Completed December 2019)
11. Updated the annual training of all System Operators on NBP IROL using simulations (Completed December 17, 2019).

NPCC has verified the completion of the mitigation activities described in this Term Sheet.

H. Financial Penalty

A \$0 penalty component has been assigned to Requirement 1. The lack of depth in the NB Power procedure (RC-EOP-4.1, Version 11, dated 6/30/16, Section 4.5, the “Operating Plan”) was not a significant contributing factor to the events of July 17-18, 2016. The total penalty is \$160,000, with \$95,000 attributed to Requirement 2 and \$65,000 attributed to Requirement 3. Payment of the penalty will be addressed by the Board.

The following factors went into the determination of the penalty for Requirement 2, VTN2018008.

- a. The Potential Violation posed a moderate risk and did not pose a serious or substantial risk to the reliability of the bulk power system.
- b. The Violation Risk Factor for this violation is high and the Violation Severity Level for this violation is Severe.
- c. There is no relevant prior compliance history of this violation.
- d. The violation was not intentional and there was no attempt to conceal the violation.
- e. The duration of the violation was less than one hour.

The following factors went into the determination of the penalty for Requirement 3, VTN2017002.


- a. The Potential Violation posed a moderate risk and did not pose a serious or substantial risk to the reliability of the bulk power system.

- b. The Violation Risk Factor for this violation is high and the Violation Severity Level for this violation is Severe.
- c. The entity self-reported the violation and took voluntary action to mitigate and prevent a reoccurrence prior to the Notice of Potential Violation.
- d. There is no relevant prior compliance history of this violation.
- e. The violation was not intentional and there was no attempt to conceal the violation.
- f. The duration of the violation was less than one hour.


I. Additional Terms

1. NB Power shall pay the financial penalty of one hundred sixty thousand dollars (\$160,000) to the NBEUB within thirty days of the execution of this Settlement Agreement.
2. This Settlement Agreement represents a full and final disposition of the violation described above and NB Power waives its right to further hearings and appeal for the Violations.
3. In the event NB Power fails to comply with any of the stipulations, remedies, sanctions or additional terms, as set forth in this Settlement Agreement, the Board may initiate enforcement, penalty, or sanction actions against NB Power to the maximum extent allowed by the Electricity Act and its Regulations.
4. The Board will issue a Notice of Settlement Agreement and publicly post this Settlement Agreement once executed. A copy of the Notice of Settlement Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
5. Each of the undersigned warrants that he or she is an authorized representative of the entity designated, is authorized to bind such entity and accepts the Settlement Agreement on the entity's behalf.
6. The undersigned representative of each party affirms that he or she has read the Settlement Agreement, that all of the matters set forth in the Settlement Agreement are true and correct to the best of his or her knowledge, information and belief, and that he or she understands that the Settlement Agreement is entered into by such party in express reliance on those representations.
7. This Settlement Agreement may be signed in counterparts.
8. This Settlement Agreement is executed in duplicate, each of which so executed shall be deemed to be an original.


Agreed to and accepted:




Kathleen Mitchell
Chief Clerk
BOARD



Date



Darren Murphy
Chief Financial Officer &
Senior Vice President Corporate Services
NB Power



Date